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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 14-4629 
_____________ 
 
MARY BOARDMAN, 
                           Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; 
BROWN'S SUPER STORE INC, 
DBA Shoprite of Oregon Avenue; 
OFFICER JAMES ARENTZEN, Badge No. 4681; 
OFFICER ROBERT SMITH, Badge No. 3232 
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-13-cv-01499) 
District Judge:  Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
Magistrate Judge: Honorable Timothy R. Rice 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 14, 2016 
____________ 
 
Before: FUENTES, SHWARTZ and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: August 11, 2016) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
                                                 
*   This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 2 
 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
  Mary Boardman commenced this action after she was arrested by Police Officers 
Robert Smith and James Arentzen at a ShopRite in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  She 
raised claims for false arrest and excessive force, among others, against the Officers and 
the City of Philadelphia, as well as certain state-law claims against ShopRite.  The 
District Court dismissed most of the claims on summary judgment, including the false 
arrest claims, leaving only the federal excessive force claim and the state-law false 
imprisonment claim against ShopRite for trial.    The jury returned a verdict in favor of 
the Officers on the excessive force count,1 and Boardman now appeals.  We will affirm.   
I. BACKGROUND 
On August 9, 2012, Mary Boardman was grocery shopping at the ShopRite 
supermarket on Oregon Avenue in Philadelphia.  Surveillance video shows that she 
opened a box of parchment bags, examined the contents, placed the contents back in the 
box and then placed the box back on the shelf.  Andrew Haenchen, a loss prevention 
associate at the store, believed this constituted theft and asked Boardman to accompany 
him to the loss prevention office.   
                                                 
1  The jury also returned a verdict in favor of ShopRite on the false imprisonment 
claim, but the Court subsequently granted Boardman’s motion for judgment as a matter 
of law with regard to that count.  Following a trial held on damages, judgment was 
entered against ShopRite in the amount of $100,130.00. The parties later settled, and the 
Court dismissed the case against ShopRite. 
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Once inside, Haenchen and another associate, Herman Jackson, asked Boardman 
for identification and to sign a “loss prevention incident report” form, which included the 
following statement:  “I was in ShopRite … and while there appropriated [certain 
articles] to my own use, without paying for or intending to pay for [the] same.”  
(Appendix (“App.”) 42.)  Boardman acknowledged that she opened the box of parchment 
bags, rendering the same not fit for resale thereby, but refused to sign the form.  In her 
view, the form contained a number of substantive inaccuracies and required her to 
confess to a crime she did not commit.  
The police were subsequently summoned to the store, and Officers Smith and 
Arentzen were told that Boardman “opened up merchandise” and “put it back on the shelf 
without paying for it.”  (App. 53.)  The Officers testified that, on hearing this, they 
concluded that she committed criminal mischief.  They were also aware, though, that 
ShopRite would not press charges if Boardman agreed to sign the form as drafted.  
Boardman refused to sign without making certain changes, and became agitated when she 
was not permitted to do so.       
Officer Smith testified that, following Boardman’s final attempt to change the 
form, one of the loss prevention associates “nod[ded] [his] head,” which Officer Smith 
interpreted to mean that ShopRite would, indeed, press charges.  (App. 56.)  Officer 
Smith then asked Boardman to stand for handcuffing, but she refused and backed away 
when the Officers attempted to stand her up themselves.  The Officers forced Boardman 
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to the ground and Boardman resisted their effort to handcuff her, relenting only after 
Officer Smith threatened to use his Taser.  With Boardman in handcuffs, Officer Smith 
called his supervisor to verify whether the accusations against her constituted theft or 
criminal mischief, and was informed that it was “not theft and that it would have been 
vandalism at best.”  (App. 60.)  Boardman agreed to sign the ShopRite form, and was 
released with no criminal charges filed against her.   
Approximately seven months later, Boardman filed a twelve-count complaint 
against the City of Philadelphia, Officers Smith and Arentzen, and ShopRite.  She alleged 
a federal excessive force claim against the Officers (Count 1), a federal false arrest claim 
against the Officers (Count 2), a Monell claim against the City (Counts 3 and 4), state-
law assault and battery against the Officers (Count 5), state-law false imprisonment 
against the Officers and ShopRite (Count 6), state-law false arrest against the Officers 
(Count 7), intentional infliction of emotional distress and conspiracy against all 
defendants (Counts 8 and 9), and corporate liability, negligent hiring, and negligent 
supervision against ShopRite (Counts 10-12).   
On March 13, 2014, on cross-motions for summary judgment, the Hon. Paul S. 
Diamond (1) granted the City’s motion in its entirety; (2) granted the Officers’ motion on 
the federal false arrest claim, and the state-law false imprisonment and false arrest claims 
(leaving the federal excessive force claim for trial); (3) granted ShopRite’s motion on 
corporate liability, negligent hiring, and negligent supervision (leaving the false 
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imprisonment claim for trial); and (4) granted defendants’ motion on Boardman’s claims 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress and conspiracy.2  With regard to the state-
law false arrest claim, the District Court concluded that, although it was “unclear whether 
Pennsylvania law authorized the Officers to arrest Plaintiff on probable cause for criminal 
mischief,” (App. 8), the Officers were entitled to governmental immunity pursuant to the 
Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 8541-8550.  
Specifically, the Court held that, because the Tort Claims Act shields officers from 
liability in the absence of “willful misconduct,” and because Boardman failed to establish 
that the Officers knew their conduct was illegal, the Officers were entitled to summary 
judgment.  (App. 9.)  Boardman’s motion for reconsideration was denied for similar 
reasons.  The remaining claims were tried before Magistrate Judge Timothy R. Rice, 
with, as relevant here, the jury returning a verdict in favor of the Officers on the 
excessive force claim.  Boardman’s timely notice of appeal followed.   
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The District Court’s decision on summary judgment 
is subject to plenary review.  See S.H. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 256 (3d 
Cir. 2013).  Jury instructions also are subject to plenary review, United States v. 
                                                 
2  Boardman abandoned on appeal her claims against the City and her claims against 
all defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress and conspiracy.  She 
abandoned at trial the assault and battery claim against the Officers.   
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Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 204 (3d Cir. 1997), but the wording of the instruction, i.e., “the 
expression,” is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 
1252, 1264 (3d Cir. 1995).  Similarly, we review evidentiary rulings at trial for abuse of 
discretion.  See United States v. Butch, 256 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Forrest 
v. Beloit Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 351 (3d Cir. 2005) (concluding that attorney’s allegedly 
improper statements in summation did not warrant a new trial).  
III. ANALYSIS 
Boardman presents four arguments on appeal: (1) the Officers demonstrated 
willful misconduct in connection with her arrest and therefore are not immune from 
liability; (2) the jury was erroneously instructed that handcuffing “without more” will 
never constitute excessive force; (3) Boardman’s objection at trial regarding the Officers’ 
legal right and obligation to arrest her should have been sustained; and (4) she was 
prejudiced at trial by her inability to inform the jury that the arrest was, in her view, 
illegal.   
A. Summary Judgment: False Arrest 
Under Pennsylvania law, the tort of false arrest requires a showing of either “(1) 
an arrest made without probable cause[,] or (2) an arrest made by a person without 
privilege to do so.”  See Renk v. City of Philadelphia, 641 A.2d 289, 295 n.2 (Pa. 1994) 
(Montemuro, J. dissenting).  “[W]hether an officer is authorized to make an arrest 
depends initially on whether state law authorizes such action.”  Commonwealth v. 
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Williams, 568 A.2d 1281, 1284 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (emphasis omitted).  
The District Court rightly concluded that, under Pennsylvania law, the Officers 
had probable cause to believe Boardman committed criminal mischief (i.e., damage to 
property), but that they lacked probable cause to arrest her for theft.  Compare 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 3304(a) (“A person is guilty of criminal mischief if he … intentionally or 
recklessly tampers with tangible property of another so as to endanger person or property 
… [or] intentionally damages real or personal property of another”) with 18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 3929(a)(1) (“A person is guilty of a retail theft if he … takes possession of, carries 
away … any merchandise … with the intention of depriving the merchant of … such 
merchandise without paying ….”).  That distinction is legally significant because, unlike 
the crime of theft, criminal mischief is categorized as a “summary offense” under 
Pennsylvania law and requires more than just probable cause to justify arrest.   
The parties hotly dispute those requirements.  Boardman points first to Rule 400 of 
the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, which deals exclusively with 
“Proceedings in Summary Cases,” and provides that “[c]riminal proceedings in summary 
cases shall be instituted either by:  (1) issuing a citation to the defendant; or (2) filing a 
citation; or (3) filing a complaint; or (4) arresting without a warrant when arrest is 
specifically authorized by law.”  Pa. R. Crim. P. 400 (emphasis added); Commonwealth v. 
Bullers, 637 A.2d 1326, 1328-29 (Pa. 1994) (holding that a “court may not permit a 
warrantless arrest for a summary offense when [the] legislature has not so provided”).  
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Because neither the criminal statute at issue nor any other municipal code provision 
authorizes an arrest without a warrant for criminal mischief, Boardman argues that she 
was falsely arrested as a matter of law.  The Officers maintain otherwise.  They urge, as 
the District Court first concluded, that it is “unclear whether Pennsylvania law authorized 
the Officers to arrest [Boardman] on probable cause for criminal mischief outside their 
presence,” (App. 8), citing recent federal cases in support.  See Huff v. Cheltenham Twp., 
2015 WL 4041963, at *9 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 2015).3  
We need not resolve this apparent dispute on appeal because, in the absence of 
willful misconduct, the Officers are entitled to immunity under the Pennsylvania Political 
Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“PSTCA”).  To conclude, as Boardman urges us to do, that 
the Officers acted with willful misconduct, a statutory exception to PSTCA immunity, we 
must find “not only that the [Officers] intended to commit the acts that [they are] accused 
of carrying out, but also that [the Officers] understood that the actions [they] intended to 
take were illegal and chose to take the actions anyway.” Maiale v. Youse, 2004 WL 
1925004, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2004); see also Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 315 
(3d Cir. 2006) (describing willful misconduct as “a demanding level of fault” akin to 
“intentional tort”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re City of Phila. Litig., 158 F.3d 
                                                 
3  The confusion stems from the interpretation of Commonwealth v. Elliott, 599 A.2d 
1335 (Pa. Super. 1991) by the District Court, as well as by the court in Huff, interpreting 
Elliott to stand for the proposition that a “police officer has authority for warrantless 
arrest for summary offense if he has probable cause.”  (App. 8.)  Boardman claims this 
interpretation was in error, and that Elliott stands only for the proposition that an officer 
may issue a citation for a summary offense committed outside the officer’s presence.   
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723, 728 (3d Cir. 1998) (explaining that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in 
Renk “require[es] a subjective standard of willfulness that calls for a showing of an 
intention to do what is known to be wrong”). In the context of this claim for false arrest, 
Boardman must show that the Officers “‘intentionally arrested [her] knowing that [they] 
lacked probable cause to do so.’” Brockington v. City of Philadelphia, 354 F. Supp. 2d 
563, 571-72 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (quoting Renk, 641 A.2d at 293) (emphasis added).  
Boardman’s theory of willful misconduct is novel but unpersuasive.  She argues 
that the Officers arrested her for refusing to sign the form, not because she committed 
criminal mischief.  She submits that a reasonable juror could conclude as much based on 
the testimony presented, and that such a juror could likewise conclude that “using [an] 
arrest to coerce a confession” constituted willful misconduct.  (Blue Br. at 27.)  In 
support, she points to the deposition testimony of Officer Smith, in which he stated, “[A]s 
she was changing [the form], that’s when we decided to make the, we made the decision 
to place her, attempt to place her in handcuffs because she was changing it.”  (App. 56.)   
To reach Boardman’s conclusion from this evidence, however, would require us to 
interpret Officer Smith’s testimony in a manner unreasonably favorable to Boardman and 
to ignore contrary testimony from the other parties.  Officer Smith testified that he was 
informed upon arrival that Boardman “opened up merchandise” and “put it back on the 
shelf without paying for it,” but that ShopRite would not press charges for that offense “if 
she signs [the loss incident form].” (App. 53.)  Similarly, Officer Arentzen testified that, 
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after Boardman refused to sign the form in his presence, the Officers informed her that “if 
she didn’t want to” sign it they were “going to have to place her under arrest” for 
“damage to property.”  (SA17.) This approach was consistent with both ShopRite’s 
policy regarding theft or misuse of store merchandise and Officer Arentzen’s practice of 
not arresting an accused despite probable cause to do so where the purported victim 
declines to press charges.     
Boardman offers no grounded explanation as to why the Officers would have 
wanted to arrest her solely for refusing to sign the form itself, and she provides no 
reasonable basis for inferring from the testimony anything other than that Officer Smith 
was summoned to arrest her for damage to property—i.e. criminal mischief—and that he 
elected to do so after the loss prevention associates signaled their intent to press charges.  
She also fails to offer any evidence or principled argument suggesting an absence of 
probable cause and, most importantly, does not identify any basis to refute or undermine 
the Officers’ belief that they were authorized to make an arrest.  See Sameric Corp. of 
Del., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 600-01 (3d Cir. 1998) (“’Willful 
misconduct,’ …, requires evidence that the defendants actually knew that their conduct 
was illegal.”). Officer Smith testified that “criminal mischief is one of the offenses that 
you can make an arrest for without a warrant” as long as there is a witness or admission, 
(App. 64), and Officer Arentzen testified that officers have the right to arrest someone 
without a warrant for a summary offense if “they admit to it.”  (SA21.)  Boardman thus 
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failed to provide any basis for inferring that the Officers believed the arrest was illegal, 
and we conclude that there is no genuine factual dispute regarding their purported willful 
misconduct.   
B. Jury Instruction: Handcuffing “without more” 
Boardman also argues that the Magistrate Judge erroneously instructed the jury in 
connection with the excessive force trial, and specifically challenges the instruction that 
“handcuffing without more” cannot constitute excessive force.  The instruction was as 
follows: 
Now in determining whether Officer Smith or Arentzen’s 
actions constituted excessive force you must ask whether the 
amount of force used was the amount a reasonable officer 
would have used under similar circumstances in making an 
arrest.  The act of handcuffing without more does not 
constitute excessive force.  Rather, you should consider all 
the relevant facts and circumstances leading up to the 
time of the arrest that Officer Smith and Officer Arentzen 
reasonably believed to be true at the time.  You should 
consider those facts and circumstances in order to assess 
whether there was a need for the application of force and the 
relationship between the need for force, if any, and the 
amount of force applied.   
(A95) (emphasis added).  Boardman claims that the instruction was contrary to our 
decision in Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 2004).  We disagree.  
The plaintiff in Kopec alleged that “Officer Tate placed handcuffs on him that 
were excessively tight and failed to respond to [his] repeated requests for them to be 
loosened.”   Id. at 777.  He alleged further that “it took Officer Tate ten minutes to loosen 
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the handcuffs despite the severe pain they were causing and his efforts to secure their 
release.”  Id.  We held that such facts would constitute excessive force if proven at trial.  
Id.  Magistrate Judge Rice discussed that decision with counsel before instructing the 
jury, and interpreted it to stand for the proposition that “handcuffing could constitute 
excessive force if there’s complaints, obvious signs of discomfort, damage that requires 
medical attention, things of that nature.”  (A17.)  He agreed that there are “circumstances 
where [handcuffing] could” constitute excessive force, but cautioned that the jury must 
nonetheless look at all the relevant circumstances—“I don’t want the jury returning a 
verdict of excessive force merely because the officers handcuffed the plaintiff.  Because I 
don’t think … that was the theory that you charged the case on, or that you filed the 
[c]omplaint on.”  (Id.) 
Magistrate Judge Rice properly acknowledged that the act of handcuffing may, in 
certain circumstances, constitute excessive force—including, but not necessarily limited 
to, those presented in Kopec.  And, by instructing the jury to consider “all of the relevant 
facts … leading up to the time of the arrest,” he accounted for the possibility of such 
circumstances, while leaving it to the jury to assess whether the force employed was 
reasonable in light thereof.  (A95.)  Boardman has not shown that the specific instruction 
of which she complains—that “handcuffing without more does not constitute excessive 
force”—misled the jury into ignoring the possibility of other exacerbating factors.   
C. Trial Objection: “Right” to Arrest 
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Boardman next claims that, throughout defense counsel’s closing, he repeatedly 
told the jury that Officers Smith and Arentzen had a legal right to arrest and that these 
purported misstatements of law warrant a new trial.  To find as much, we must conclude 
both that the argument was “so gross as probably to prejudice” Boardman’s likelihood of 
success and that “the prejudice [was not] neutralized by the trial judge before submission 
of the case to the jury.”  United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 738 (3d Cir. 1974) 
(citation omitted).   
Even assuming that Boardman was somehow prejudiced by these statements,4 
Magistrate Judge Rice’s instruction neutralized any possibility that the jury would be 
influenced thereby.  Boardman’s argument is that the grade of her offense was so 
minimal that it could not legally warrant an arrest, let alone the use of force attendant 
thereto.  This concern was properly accounted for by the Court’s instruction that the jury 
consider “the severity of the crime at issue [and] whether [Boardman] posed an 
immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others.”  (A95.)  The jury was free to 
consider whether the nature of her offense rendered the force applied more or less 
justifiable. Magistrate Judge Rice did not abuse his discretion in rejecting Boardman’s 
argument.   
D. Prejudice 
Finally, Boardman argues that a new trial is warranted because her excessive force 
                                                 
4  For the reasons outlined in the following section, we conclude that she was not.  
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trial would have been different if the District Court had not “erroneously” dismissed her 
false arrest claim against the Officers at summary judgment.  This argument ignores the 
fact that the lawfulness of Boardman’s arrest does not bear upon her excessive force 
claim.  See Romero v. Story, 672 F.3d 880, 890 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[I]f the district court 
concludes the arrest was unlawful, the court may not automatically find any force used in 
effecting the unlawful arrest to be excessive. Instead, the district court must then analyze 
the excessive force inquiry under the assumption the arrest was lawful.”) (citing Cortez v. 
McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1126 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc)); see also Snell v. City of 
York, 564 F.3d 659, 672 (3d Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument that “the force applied was 
excessive solely because probable cause was lacking for his arrest” as well as “similar 
efforts to bootstrap excessive force claims and probable cause challenges.”)  Boardman 
suffered no prejudice by virtue of her inability to tell the jury that the arrest was unlawful, 
and she otherwise presents no ground with any merit for a new trial.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 The Orders of the District Court will be affirmed.    
 
